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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP13944 |
DP13944 Ownership, wealth, and risk taking: Evidence on private equity fund managers | |
Karin S. Thorburn; Carsten Bienz; Uwe Walz | |
发表日期 | 2019-08-21 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We examine the incentive effects of private equity (PE) professionals' ownership in the funds they manage. In a simple model, we show that managers select less risky firms and use more debt financing the higher their ownership. We test these predictions for a sample of PE funds in Norway, where the professionals' private wealth is public. Consistent with the model, firm risk decreases and leverage increases with the manager's ownership in the fund, but largely only when scaled with her wealth. Moreover, the higher the ownership, the smaller is each individual investment, increasing fund diversification. Our results suggest that wealth is of first order importance when designing incentive contracts requiring PE fund managers to coinvest. |
主题 | Financial Economics |
关键词 | Private equity Buyouts Incentives General partner Ownership Risk taking Wealth |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13944 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542825 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Karin S. Thorburn,Carsten Bienz,Uwe Walz. DP13944 Ownership, wealth, and risk taking: Evidence on private equity fund managers. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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