G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13944
DP13944 Ownership, wealth, and risk taking: Evidence on private equity fund managers
Karin S. Thorburn; Carsten Bienz; Uwe Walz
发表日期2019-08-21
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We examine the incentive effects of private equity (PE) professionals' ownership in the funds they manage. In a simple model, we show that managers select less risky firms and use more debt financing the higher their ownership. We test these predictions for a sample of PE funds in Norway, where the professionals' private wealth is public. Consistent with the model, firm risk decreases and leverage increases with the manager's ownership in the fund, but largely only when scaled with her wealth. Moreover, the higher the ownership, the smaller is each individual investment, increasing fund diversification. Our results suggest that wealth is of first order importance when designing incentive contracts requiring PE fund managers to coinvest.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Private equity Buyouts Incentives General partner Ownership Risk taking Wealth
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13944
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542825
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Karin S. Thorburn,Carsten Bienz,Uwe Walz. DP13944 Ownership, wealth, and risk taking: Evidence on private equity fund managers. 2019.
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