| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13951 |
| DP13951 Macroprudential Policy with Leakages | |
| Julien Bengui; Javier Bianchi | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The outreach of macroprudential policies is likely limited in practice by imperfect regulation enforcement, whether due to shadow banking, regulatory arbitrage, or other regulation circumvention schemes. We study how such concerns affect the design of optimal regulatory policy in a workhorse model in which pecuniary externalities call for macroprudential taxes on debt, but with the addition of a novel constraint that financial regulators lack the ability to enforce taxes on a subset of agents. While regulated agents reduce risk taking in response to debt taxes, unregulated agents react to the safer environment by taking on more risk. These leakages do undermine the effectiveness of macruprudential taxes, yet they do not necessarily call for weaker interventions. Quantitatively, we find that a well-designed macroprudential policy that accounts for leakages remains successful at mitigating the vulnerability to financial crises. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Macroprudential policy Capital flow management Regulatory arbitrage Financial crises Limited regulation enforcement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13951 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542832 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Julien Bengui,Javier Bianchi. DP13951 Macroprudential Policy with Leakages. 2019. |
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