| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13959 |
| DP13959 A Menu of Insurance Contracts for the Unemployed | |
| Régis Barnichon; Yanos Zylberberg | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-27 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Unemployment insurance (UI) programs traditionally take the form of a single insurance contract offered to job seekers. In this work, we show that offering a menu of contracts can be welfare improving in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. When insurance contracts are composed of (i) a UI payment and (ii) a severance payment paid at the onset of unemployment, offering contracts with different ratios of UI benefits to severance payment is optimal under the equivalent of a single-crossing condition: job seekers in higher need of unemployment insurance should be less prone to moral hazard. In that setting, a menu allows the planner to attract job seekers with a high need for insurance in a contract with generous UI benefits, and to attract job seekers most prone to moral hazard in a separate contract with a large severance payment but little unemployment insurance. We propose a simple sufficient statistics approach to test the single-crossing condition in the data. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Unemployment insurance Adverse selection Moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13959 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542840 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Régis Barnichon,Yanos Zylberberg. DP13959 A Menu of Insurance Contracts for the Unemployed. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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