| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13967 |
| DP13967 Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good | |
| Laura Doval; Vasiliki Skreta | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-29 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that posted prices are the optimal mechanism to sell a durable good to a privately informed buyer when the seller has limited commitment in an infinite horizon setting. We provide a methodology for mechanism design with limited commitment and transferable utility. Whereas in the case of commitment, subject to the buyer's truthtelling and participation constraints, the seller's problem is a decision problem, in the case of limited commitment, the seller's problem corresponds to an intrapersonal game, where different "incarnations" of the seller represent the different beliefs he may have about the buyer's valuation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Mechanism design Limited commitment Intrapersonal equilibrium Information design Self-generation Posted price |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13967 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542848 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laura Doval,Vasiliki Skreta. DP13967 Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good. 2019. |
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