G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13985
DP13985 Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State
Kenju Kamei; Louis Putterman; Jean-Robert Tyran
发表日期2019-09-05
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要Effective states provide public goods by taxing their citizens and imposing penalties for non-compliance. However, accountable government requires that enough citizens are civically engaged. We study the voluntary cooperative underpinnings of the accountable state by conducting a two-level public goods experiment in which civic engagement can build a sanction scheme to solve the first-order public goods dilemma. We find that civic engagement can be sustained at high levels when costs are low relative to the benefits of public good provision. This cost-to-benefit differential yields what we call a “leverage effect” because it transforms modest willingness to cooperate into the larger social dividend from the power of taxation. In addition, we find that local social interaction among subgroups of participants also boosts cooperation.
主题Public Economics
关键词Civic engagement Public goods provision Experiment Cooperation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13985
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542866
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kenju Kamei,Louis Putterman,Jean-Robert Tyran. DP13985 Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State. 2019.
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