| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14003 |
| DP14003 Fiscal distress and banking performance: The role of macroprudential regulation | |
| Harris Dellas; Hiona Balfoussia; Dimitris Papageorgiou | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-17 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Fiscal fragility can undermine a government’s ability to honor its bank deposit insurance pledge and induces a positive correlation between sovereign default risk and financial (bank) default risk. We show that this positive relation is reversed if bank capital requirements in fiscally weak countries are allowed to adjust optimally. The resulting higher requirements buttress the banking system and support higher output and welfare relative to the case where macroprudential policy does not vary with the degree of fiscal stress. Fiscal tenuousness also exacerbates the effects of other risk shocks. Nonetheless, the economy’s response can be mitigated if macroprudential policy is adjusted optimally. Our analysis implies that, on the basis of fiscal strength, fiscally weak countries would favor and fiscally strong countries would object to banking union. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Fiscal distress Bank performance Optimal macroprudential policy Greece Banking union |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14003 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542885 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harris Dellas,Hiona Balfoussia,Dimitris Papageorgiou. DP14003 Fiscal distress and banking performance: The role of macroprudential regulation. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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