G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14005
DP14005 Entry decisions and asymmetric competition between non-profit and for-profit homes in the long-term care market
Iris Grant; Johannes Van Biesebroeck
发表日期2019-09-17
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要Mostly due to population aging, the demand for long-term care (LTC) services is growing strongly. Historically, non-profit nursing homes dominated the German LTC market, but the recent entry wave was tilted towards for-profit competitors. Using a rich administrative dataset on all LTC facilities in Germany, we examine strategic interaction between these two ownership types in a static entry model. The estimates of competitive effects imply that non-profit and for-profit homes are substitutes, but competition is much stronger within-type, suggesting that they provide differentiated products. For-profit homes in particular act as if they operate in a different market segment, but over time their entry behavior has converged to that of the more established non-profits. Counterfactual simulations of proposed changes in government policy suggest a large impact on the fraction of markets that remain unserved or only served by a single type.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Competition Long-term care Non-profit For-profit
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14005-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542887
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Iris Grant,Johannes Van Biesebroeck. DP14005 Entry decisions and asymmetric competition between non-profit and for-profit homes in the long-term care market. 2019.
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