| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14018 |
| DP14018 Family Ownership and Antitrust Violations | |
| Mario Daniele Amore; Riccardo Marzano | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how family ownership shapes the firms’ likelihood of being involved in antitrust indictments. Using data from Italy, we show that family firms are significantly less likely than other firms to commit antitrust violations. To achieve identification, we exploit a law change that made it easier to transfer family control. Studying the mechanisms at play, we find that family firms are especially less likely to commit antitrust violations when they feature a more prominent size relative to the city where they are located, which magnifies reputational concerns. Next, we show that family firms involved in antitrust violations appoint more family members in top executive positions in the aftermath of the indictment. Moreover, these firms invest less and curb equity financing as compared to nonfamily firms. Collectively, our findings suggest that family control wards off reputational damages but, at the same time, it weakens the ability to expand in order to keep up with fiercer competition following the dismantlement of the anticompetitive practice. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Antitrust violation Ownership investment Financing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14018 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542902 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mario Daniele Amore,Riccardo Marzano. DP14018 Family Ownership and Antitrust Violations. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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