G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14055
DP14055 Insolvency-Illiquidity, Macro Externalities and Regulation
Ester Faia
发表日期2019-10-15
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the optimal design of equity and liquidity regulations in a dynamic macro model with information-based bank runs. Although the latter are privately efficient, since they discipline bank managers efforts into the projects' re-deploying activity, they induce aggregate externalities. Technological inefficiencies arise if bank managers extract rents which are higher than the technological costs of re-deploying projects. Pecuniary externalities arise since, when choosing leverage, bank managers do not internalize the fall in asset price ensuing from the aggregate costs of projects' liquidation in a run event. This creates scope for regulation. Equity and liquidity requirements are complementary, as the first tackles the solvency region, while the second the illiquid-solvent one. Finally, in presence of anticipatory effects prudential policies may have unintended consequences as banks adjust their behaviour when a shift in prudential regime is announced. The more so the higher the credibility of the announcement.
主题Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
关键词Information-based bank runs Pecuniary externalities Ramsey plan Basel regimes Equity requirements Liquidity requirements
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14055
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542943
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ester Faia. DP14055 Insolvency-Illiquidity, Macro Externalities and Regulation. 2019.
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