| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14075 |
| DP14075 Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games | |
| Johannes Hörner; Nicolas Klein; Sven Rady | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers a class of experimentation games with Lévy bandits encompassing those of Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). Its main result is that efficient (perfect Bayesian) equilibria exist whenever players’ payoffs have a diffusion component. Hence, the trade-offs emphasized in the literature do not rely on the intrinsic nature of bandit models but on the commonly adopted solution concept (MPE). This is not an artifact of continuous time: we prove that such equilibria arise as limits of equilibria in the discrete-time game. Furthermore, it suffices to relax the solution concept to strongly symmetric equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Two-armed bandit Bayesian learning Strategic experimentation Strongly symmetric equilibrium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14075 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542961 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Johannes Hörner,Nicolas Klein,Sven Rady. DP14075 Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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