| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14085 |
| DP14085 Rules and Commitment in Communication | |
| Guilaume Frechette; Jacopo Perego | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-28 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate models of cheap talk, information disclosure, and Bayesian persuasion, in a unified experimental framework. Our umbrella design permits the analysis of models that share the same structure regarding preferences and information, but differ in two dimensions: the \emph{rules} governing communication, which determine whether information is verifiable; and the sender’s \emph{commitment} power, which determines the extent to which she can commit to her communication strategy. Commitment is predicted to have contrasting effects on information transmission, depending on whether information is verifiable. Our design exploits these variations to explicitly test for the role of rules and commitment in communication. Our experiments provide general support for the strategic rationale behind the role of commitment and, more specifically, for the Bayesian persuasion model of \cite{Kamenica2011}. At the same time, we document significant quantitative deviations. Most notably, we find that rules matter in ways that are entirely unpredicted by the theory, suggesting a novel policy role for information verifiability. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14085 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542972 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guilaume Frechette,Jacopo Perego. DP14085 Rules and Commitment in Communication. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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