| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP14087
|
| DP14087 Imperfect Information, Social Norms, and Beliefs in Networks |
| Marc Sommer; Yves Zenou
|
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-30
|
| 出版年 | 2019
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We develop a simple Bayesian network game in which players, embedded in a network of social interactions, bear a cost from deviating from the social norm of their peers. All agents face uncertainty about the private benefits and the private and social costs of their actions. We
prove the existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and characterize players’ optimal actions. We then show that denser networks do not necessary increase agents’ actions and welfare. We also find that, in some cases, it is optimal for the planner to affect the payoffs of selected individuals rather than all agents in the network. We finally show that having more information is not always beneficial to agents and can, in fact, reduce their welfare. We illustrate all our results in the context of criminal networks in which offenders do not know
with certitude the probability of being caught and do not want to be different from their peers in terms of criminal activities. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Bayesian games
beliefs
Networks
Conformism
Value of information
Crime
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14087
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542974
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Marc Sommer,Yves Zenou. DP14087 Imperfect Information, Social Norms, and Beliefs in Networks. 2019.
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