| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14088 |
| DP14088 Naivete and Sophistication in Initial and Repeated Play in Games | |
| Nagore Iriberri; Bernardo Garcia-Pola | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Naive, non-equilibrium, behavioral rules, compared to more sophisticated equilibrium theory, are often better in describing individuals' initial play in games. Additionally, in repeated play in games, when individuals have the oppor- tunity to learn about their opponents' past behavior, learning models of different sophistication levels are successful in explaining how individuals modify their be- havior in response to feedback. How do subjects following different behavioral rules in initial play modify their behavior after learning about past behavior? This study links both initial and repeated play in games, analyzing elicited be- havior in 3x3 normal-form games using a within-subject laboratory design. We classify individuals into different behavioral rules in both initial and repeated play and test whether and/or how naivete and sophistication in initial play cor- relates with naivete and sophistication in repeated play. We find no evidence for a correlation between naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Naivete Sophistication Initial play Repeated play Level-k thinking Adaptive and sophisticated learning Mixture-of-types estimation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14088 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542975 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nagore Iriberri,Bernardo Garcia-Pola. DP14088 Naivete and Sophistication in Initial and Repeated Play in Games. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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