G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14103
DP14103 Searching Forever After
Yair Antler; Benjamin Bachi
发表日期2019-11-05
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We study a model of two-sided search in which agents' reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while, for all other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to their prospects in the market. Consequently, they search longer than optimal. Moreover, agents with intermediate match values may search indefinitely while all other agents eventually marry. We show that the share of eternal singles converges monotonically to 1 as search frictions vanish. Thus, improvements in the search technology may backfire and even lead to market failure.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Boundedly rational expectations Two-sided search Matching Dating Marriage market Coarse reasoning
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14103
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542990
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Yair Antler,Benjamin Bachi. DP14103 Searching Forever After. 2019.
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