G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14126
DP14126 Political Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe
Maurizio Bussolo; Francesca de Nicola; Ugo Panizza; Richard Varghese
发表日期2019-11-16
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We examine whether political connections ease financial constraints faced by firms. Using firm-level data from six Central and Eastern European economies, we show that politically connected firms are characterized by: (i) higher leverage, (ii) lower profitability, (iii) lower capitalization, (iv) lower marginal productivity of capital, and (v) lower levels of investment than unconnected firms. Politically connected firms borrow more because they have easier access than unconnected firms to credit but tend to be less productive than unconnected firms. Our results are consistent with the idea that political connections distort capital allocation and may have welfare costs.
主题Financial Economics ; Public Economics
关键词investment Political connections Corruption Financial constraints
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14126
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543015
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Maurizio Bussolo,Francesca de Nicola,Ugo Panizza,et al. DP14126 Political Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe. 2019.
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