| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14126 |
| DP14126 Political Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe | |
| Maurizio Bussolo; Francesca de Nicola; Ugo Panizza; Richard Varghese | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-11-16 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine whether political connections ease financial constraints faced by firms. Using firm-level data from six Central and Eastern European economies, we show that politically connected firms are characterized by: (i) higher leverage, (ii) lower profitability, (iii) lower capitalization, (iv) lower marginal productivity of capital, and (v) lower levels of investment than unconnected firms. Politically connected firms borrow more because they have easier access than unconnected firms to credit but tend to be less productive than unconnected firms. Our results are consistent with the idea that political connections distort capital allocation and may have welfare costs. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | investment Political connections Corruption Financial constraints |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14126 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543015 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maurizio Bussolo,Francesca de Nicola,Ugo Panizza,et al. DP14126 Political Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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