| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14148 |
| DP14148 Altruism, Insurance, And Costly Solidarity Commitments1 | |
| Christopher Barrett; Eleonora Patacchini; Thomas Walker | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-11-24 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Inter-household transfers play a central role in village economies. Whether understood as informal insurance, credit, or social taxation, the dominant concep- tual models used to explain transfers rest on a foundation of self-interested dynamic behavior. Using experimental data from households in rural Ghana, where we ran- domized private and publicly observable cash payouts repeated every other month for a year, we reject two core predictions of the dominant models. We then add impure altruism and social taxation to a model of limited commitment informal insurance networks. The data support this new model's predictions, including that unobserv- able income shocks may facilitate altruistic giving that better targets less-well-off individuals within one's network, and that too large a network can overwhelm even an altruistic agent, inducing her to cease giving. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14148 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543035 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Barrett,Eleonora Patacchini,Thomas Walker. DP14148 Altruism, Insurance, And Costly Solidarity Commitments1. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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