| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14151 |
| DP14151 Labor in the Boardroom | |
| Simon Jäger; Benjamin Schoefer; Joerg Heining | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-11-26 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate the effects of a mandate allocating a third of corporate board seats to workers (shared governance). We study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for certain firms incorporated after August 1994 but locked it in for the older cohorts. In sharp contrast to the canonical hold-up hypothesis – that increasing labor’s power reduces owners’ capital investment – we find that granting formal control rights to workers raises capital formation. The capital stock, the capital-labor ratio, and the capital share all increase. Shared governance does not raise wage premia or rent sharing. It lowers outsourcing, while moderately shifting employment to skilled labor. Shared governance has no clear effect on profitability, leverage, or costs of debt. Overall, the evidence is consistent with richer models of industrial relations whereby shared governance raises capital by permitting workers to bargain over investment or by institutionalizing communication and repeated interactions between labor and capital. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth |
| 关键词 | Industrial relations Corporate governance Codetermination Investments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14151 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543038 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simon Jäger,Benjamin Schoefer,Joerg Heining. DP14151 Labor in the Boardroom. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
