| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14160 |
| DP14160 Public Liquidity Demand and Central Bank Independence | |
| Guillaume Plantin; Jean Barthélemy; Eric Mengus | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies how a crisis that induces a large negative fiscal shock and a strong demand for safe stores of value affects the independence of a central bank vis-a-vis a fiscal authority that seeks to inflate away public liabilities. We find that the central bank can maintain price stability only if there is a large demand for its liabilities, so that it can control the net increase in government debt held by the private sector. We show that fiscal requirements are necessary even with low interest rates and massive reserve issuance is not necessarily a sign of fiscal dominance. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14160-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543046 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guillaume Plantin,Jean Barthélemy,Eric Mengus. DP14160 Public Liquidity Demand and Central Bank Independence. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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