| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14162 |
| DP14162 Consumer information and the limits to competition | |
| Mark Armstrong; Jidong Zhou | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-02 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a private signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures which allow pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures which are optimal for firms and those which are optimal for consumers. The firm-optimal signal structure amplifies the underlying product differentiation, thereby relaxing competition, while ensuring that consumers purchase their preferred product, thereby maximizing total welfare. The consumer-optimal structure dampens differentiation, which intensifies competition, but induces some consumers with weak preferences between products to buy their less-preferred product. The analysis sheds light on the limits to competition when the information possessed by consumers can be designed flexibly. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information design Bertrand competition Product differentiation Online platforms |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14162 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543049 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Armstrong,Jidong Zhou. DP14162 Consumer information and the limits to competition. 2019. |
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