| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14172 |
| DP14172 Acquisition for Sleep | |
| Lars Persson; Pehr-Johan Norbäck; Charlotta Olofsson | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-06 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Within the policy debate, there is a fear that large incumbent firms buy small firms' inventions to ensure that they are not used in the market. We show that such "acquisitions for sleep" can occur if and only if the quality of a process invention is small; otherwise, the entry profit will be higher than the entry-deterring value. We then show that the incentive for acquiring for the purpose of putting a patent to sleep decreases when the intellectual property law is stricter because the profit for the entrant then increases more than the entry-deterring value does. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Acquisitions Innovation Sleeping patents Ip law Ownership |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14172 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543060 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lars Persson,Pehr-Johan Norbäck,Charlotta Olofsson. DP14172 Acquisition for Sleep. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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