| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14213 |
| DP14213 Inputs, Incentives, and Self-selection At the Workplace | |
| Francesco Amodio; Miguel Martinez-Carrasco | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-18 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies how asymmetric information over inputs affects workers’ response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace. Using daily records from a Peruvian egg production plant, we exploit a sudden change in the worker salary structure and find that workers’ effort, firm profits, and worker participation change differentially along the two margins of input quality and worker type. Firm profits increase differentially from high productivity workers, but absenteeism and quits of these workers also differentially increase. Evidence shows that information asymmetries over inputs between workers and managers shape the response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Input heterogeneity Incentives Self-selection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14213 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543101 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Amodio,Miguel Martinez-Carrasco. DP14213 Inputs, Incentives, and Self-selection At the Workplace. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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