| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14231 |
| DP14231 Granular Search, Market Structure, and Wages | |
| Gregor Jarosch; Jan Sebastian Nimczik | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-22 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We build a model where firm size is a source of labor market power. The key mechanism is that a granular employer can eliminate its own vacancies from a worker's outside option in the wage bargain. Hence, a granular employer does not compete with itself. We show how wages depend on employment concentration and then use the model to quantify the effects of granular market power. In Austrian micro-data, we find that granular market power depresses wages by about ten percent and can explain 40 percent of the observed decline in the labor share from 1997 to 2015. Mergers decrease competition for workers and reduce wages even at non-merging firms. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14231 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543117 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gregor Jarosch,Jan Sebastian Nimczik. DP14231 Granular Search, Market Structure, and Wages. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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