| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14243 |
| DP14243 Too many Voters to Fail: Influencing and Political Bargaining for Bailouts | |
| Linda Schilling | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-24 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper provides a novel theory of how banks not only exploit but also cause being perceived as 'too big to fail'. Bank creditors are also voters. Economic voting prompts politicians to grant bailouts given a bank failure. The bank's capital structure acts as a tool to impact the electoral vote and thus the bail-out by changing the relative group size of voters who favor as opposed to voters who object the bailout. The creditors' anticipation of high bailouts, in return, allows the bank to reduce funding costs today, by this maximizing revenues. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate finance Bail-outs Political economy Economic voting Capital structure Influencing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14243 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543129 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Linda Schilling. DP14243 Too many Voters to Fail: Influencing and Political Bargaining for Bailouts. 2019. |
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