| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14244 |
| DP14244 Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution | |
| Linda Schilling | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-24 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze optimal strategic delay of bank resolution (\grq forbearance') and deposit insurance coverage. After bad news on the bank's assets, depositors fear for the uninsured part of their deposit and withdraw while the regulator observes withdrawals and needs to decide when to intervene. Optimal policy maximizes the joint value of the demand deposit contract and the insurance fund to avoid inefficient risk-shifting towards the fund while also preventing inefficient runs. Under low insurance coverage, the optimal intervention policy is never to intervene (laissez-faire). Optimal deposit insurance coverage is always interior. The paper sheds light on the differences between the U.S. and the European Monetary Union concerning their bank resolution policies. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Bank resolution Deposit insurance Global games Suspension of convertibility Bank run Mandatory stay Forbearance Deposit freeze Recovery rates |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14244 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543130 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Linda Schilling. DP14244 Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution. 2019. |
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