G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14283
DP14283 Material Incentives and Effort Choice: Evidence from an Online Experiment Across Countries
Marcel Fafchamps; Elwyn Davies
发表日期2020-01-06
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We conduct in the an interactive online experiment framed as an employment contract between employer and worker. Subjects from the US and India are matched in pairs within and across countries. Employers make a one-period offer to a worker who can either decline or choose a high or low effort. The offer is made from within a restricted and variable set of possible contracts: high and low fixed wage; bonus and malus contracts; and bonus and malus with reneging. High effort is always efficient. Self-interest predicts a fraction of observed choices, but many choices indicate conditional or unconditional cooperation instead. Indian subjects are more likely to play unconditional cooperation and provide high effort more often. US subjects are more likely to follow self-interest. Indian subjects reach a more efficient outcome than US subjects in 5 of the 6 treatments. Survey data on demographics and attitudes to incentives is unable to predict behavioral differences between the two countries, suggesting the possible existence of cultural differences in the response to labor incentives.
主题Development Economics
关键词Work incentives Labor contracts Intrinsic motivation Conditional cooperation Cross-country comparisons
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14283
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543175
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marcel Fafchamps,Elwyn Davies. DP14283 Material Incentives and Effort Choice: Evidence from an Online Experiment Across Countries. 2020.
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