| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14284 |
| DP14284 Learning Management Through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design | |
| Marcel Fafchamps; Girum Abebe; Michael Koelle; Simon Quinn | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We place young professionals into established firms to shadow middle managers. Using random assignment into program participation, we find positive average effects on wage employment, but no average effect on the likelihood of self-employment. We match individuals to firms using a deferred-acceptance algorithm, and show how this allows us to identify heterogeneous treatment effects by firm and intern characteristics. We find striking heterogeneity in self-employment effects, and show that some assignment mechanisms can substantially outperform random matching in generating employment and income effects. These results demonstrate the potential for matching algorithms to improve the design of field experiments. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Field experiments Management practices Self-employment Causal inference Propensity score |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14284 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543176 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcel Fafchamps,Girum Abebe,Michael Koelle,et al. DP14284 Learning Management Through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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