G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14289
DP14289 Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion
Ben Lockwood; James Rockey
发表日期2020-01-08
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要This paper studies the effect of voter loss-aversion in preferences over both candidate policy platforms and candidate valence on electoral competition. Loss-aversion over platforms leads to both platform rigidity and reduced platform polarisation, whereas loss-aversion over valence results in increased polarization and also the possibility of asymmetric equilibria with a self-fulfilling (dis)-advantage for the incumbent. The results are robust to a stochastic link between platforms and outcomes; they hold approximately for a small amount of noise. A testable implication of loss-aversion over platforms is that incumbents adjust less than challengers to shifts in voter preferences. We find some empirical support for this using data for elections to the US House of Representatives.
主题Public Economics
关键词Electoral competition Loss-aversion
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14289
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543182
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ben Lockwood,James Rockey. DP14289 Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion. 2020.
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