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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP14289 |
DP14289 Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion | |
Ben Lockwood; James Rockey | |
发表日期 | 2020-01-08 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper studies the effect of voter loss-aversion in preferences over both candidate policy platforms and candidate valence on electoral competition. Loss-aversion over platforms leads to both platform rigidity and reduced platform polarisation, whereas loss-aversion over valence results in increased polarization and also the possibility of asymmetric equilibria with a self-fulfilling (dis)-advantage for the incumbent. The results are robust to a stochastic link between platforms and outcomes; they hold approximately for a small amount of noise. A testable implication of loss-aversion over platforms is that incumbents adjust less than challengers to shifts in voter preferences. We find some empirical support for this using data for elections to the US House of Representatives. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Electoral competition Loss-aversion |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14289 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543182 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ben Lockwood,James Rockey. DP14289 Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion. 2020. |
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