全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP14291 Unbundling Polarization

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP14291
	DP14291 Unbundling Polarization
	Nathan Canen; Chad Kendall; Francesco Trebbi
发表日期	2020-01-08
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	This paper investigates the determinants of political polarization, a phenomenon of increasing relevance in Western democracies. How much of polarization is driven by divergence in the ideologies of politicians? How much is instead the result of changes in the capacity of parties to control their members? We use detailed internal information on party discipline in the context of the U.S. Congress – whip count data for 1977-1986 – to identify and structurally estimate an economic model of legislative activity in which agenda selection, party discipline, and member votes are endogenous. The model delivers estimates of the ideological preferences of politicians, the extent of party control, and allows us to assess the effects of polarization through agenda setting (i.e. which alternatives to a status quo are strategically pursued). We find that parties account for approximately 40 percent of the political polarization in legislative voting over this time period, a critical inflection point in U.S. polarization. We also show that, absent party control, historically significant economic policies would have not passed or lost substantial support. Counterfactual exercises establish that party control is highly relevant for the probability of success of a given bill and that polarization in ideological preferences is more consequential for policy selection, resulting in different bills being pursued.
主题	Public Economics
关键词	Ideology Political polarization Us congress Political parties
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp14291
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543183
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Nathan Canen,Chad Kendall,Francesco Trebbi. DP14291 Unbundling Polarization. 2020.