| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14301 |
| DP14301 God insures those who pay? Formal insurance and religious offerings in Ghana. | |
| Emmanuelle Auriol; Amma Panin; Eva Raiber; Paul Seabright | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-12 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between them- selves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with signicant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give signicantly less money to their own church compared to members that only receive information about the insurance. Enrollment also reduces giving towards other spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance. The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Economics of religion Informal insurance Charitable giving |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14301 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543192 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emmanuelle Auriol,Amma Panin,Eva Raiber,et al. DP14301 God insures those who pay? Formal insurance and religious offerings in Ghana.. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
