全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP14307 The good, the bad, and the complex: product design with asymmetric information

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP14307
	DP14307 The good, the bad, and the complex: product design with asymmetric information
	Victoria Vanasco; Vladimir Asriyan; Dana Foarta
发表日期	2020-01-14
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	This paper explores the incentives of product designers to complexify products, and the resulting implications for overall product quality. In our model, a consumer can accept or reject a product proposed by a designer, who can affect the quality and the complexity of the product. While the product's quality determines the direct benefits of the product to the consumer, the product's complexity affects how costly it is for this Bayesian consumer to extract information about the product's quality. Examples include banks that design financial products that they later offer to retail investors, or policymakers who propose policies for approval by voters. We find that complexity is not necessarily a feature of low quality products. While an increase in alignment between the consumer and the designer leads to more complex but better quality products, higher product demand or lower competition among designers leads to more complex and lower quality products. Our findings produce novel empirical implications on the relationship between quality and complexity of financial products and regulatory policies, which are consistent with recent evidence.
主题	Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization
关键词	Product design Information frictions Information acquisition Signaling Complexity Regulation Financial products
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp14307
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543199
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Victoria Vanasco,Vladimir Asriyan,Dana Foarta. DP14307 The good, the bad, and the complex: product design with asymmetric information. 2020.