G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14333
DP14333 Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword
Dirk Krueger; Harold Cole; George J. Mailath; Yena Park
发表日期2020-01-20
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when coalitions may deviate. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any deviating coalition rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term "social capital''. We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviating coalitions symmetrically and show that higher social capital tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates both the formation of the original as well as a deviating coalition. As a consequence, although social capital facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of social capital and equilibrium allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: social capital is indeed a double-edged sword.
主题International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations ; Public Economics
关键词Coalitions Risk sharing Limited commitment
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14333-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543224
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dirk Krueger,Harold Cole,George J. Mailath,et al. DP14333 Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword. 2020.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Dirk Krueger]的文章
[Harold Cole]的文章
[George J. Mailath]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Dirk Krueger]的文章
[Harold Cole]的文章
[George J. Mailath]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Dirk Krueger]的文章
[Harold Cole]的文章
[George J. Mailath]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。