| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14333 |
| DP14333 Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions | |
| Dirk Krueger; Harold Cole; George J. Mailath; Yena Park | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-20 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when coalitions may deviate. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any deviating coalition rely on a belief in future cooperation, and we treat the contracting conditions of original and deviating coalitions symmetrically. We show that better belief coordination (higher social capital) tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates both the formation of the original as well as a deviating coalition. As a consequence, the payoff of successfully formed coalitions might be declining in the degree of belief coordination and equilibrium allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Coalitions Risk sharing Limited commitment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14333 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543225 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Krueger,Harold Cole,George J. Mailath,et al. DP14333 Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
