G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14337
DP14337 Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Banking For All?
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde; Daniel Sanches; Linda Schilling; Harald Uhlig
发表日期2020-01-21
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要The introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) allows the central bank to engage in large-scale intermediation by competing with private financial intermediaries for deposits. Yet, since a central bank is not an investment expert, it cannot invest in long-term projects itself, but relies on investment banks to do so. We derive an equivalence result that shows that absent a banking panic, the set of allocations achieved with private financial intermediation will also be achieved with a CBDC. During a panic, however, we show that the rigidity of the central bank's contract with the investment banks has the capacity to deter runs. Thus, the central bank is more stable than the commercial banking sector. Depositors internalize this feature ex-ante, and the central bank arises as a deposit monopolist, attracting all deposits away from the commercial banking sector. This monopoly might endangered maturity transformation.
主题Central Banking
关键词Central bank digital currency Central banking Intermediation Maturity transformation Bank runs Lender of last resort
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14337
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543229
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde,Daniel Sanches,Linda Schilling,et al. DP14337 Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Banking For All?. 2020.
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