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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP14342 |
DP14342 Estimation of (static or dynamic) games under equilibrium multiplicity | |
Martin Pesendorfer; Taisuke Otsu; Yuya Sasaki; Yuya Takahashi | |
发表日期 | 2020-01-22 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We propose a multiplicity-robust estimation method for (static or dynamic) games. The method allows for distinct behaviors and strategies across markets by treating market specific behaviors as correlated latent variables, with their conditional probability measure treated as an infinite-dimensional nuisance parameter. Instead of solving the intermediate problem which requires optimization over the infinite dimensional set, we consider the equivalent dual problem which entails optimization over only a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. This property allows for a practically feasible characterization of the identified region for the structural parameters. We apply the estimation method to newspaper market previously studied in Gentzkow et al. (2014) to characterize the identified region of marginal costs. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14342 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543234 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Pesendorfer,Taisuke Otsu,Yuya Sasaki,et al. DP14342 Estimation of (static or dynamic) games under equilibrium multiplicity. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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