| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14356 |
| DP14356 Using Social Connections and Financial Incentives to Solve Coordination Failure: A Quasi-Field Experiment in India's Manufacturing Sector | |
| Farzana Afridi; Amrita Dhillon; Sherry Xin Li; Swati Sharma | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Production processes are often organized in teams, yet there is limited evidence on whether and how social connections and financial incentives affect productivity in tasks that require coordination among workers. We simulate assembly line production in a lab-in-the-field experiment in which workers exert real effort in a minimum-effort game in teams whose members are either socially connected or unconnected and are paid according to the group output. We find that group output increases by 18%, and coordination improves by 30-39% when workers are socially connected with their co-workers. These findings can plausibly be explained by the higher levels of pro-social motivation between co-workers in socially connected teams. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Caste-based networks Social incentives Financial incentives Minimum effort game Output Coordination |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14356 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543249 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Farzana Afridi,Amrita Dhillon,Sherry Xin Li,et al. DP14356 Using Social Connections and Financial Incentives to Solve Coordination Failure: A Quasi-Field Experiment in India's Manufacturing Sector. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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