G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14358
DP14358 Attracting the Sharks: Corporate Innovation and Securities Class Action Lawsuits
Elisabeth Kempf; Oliver G. Spalt
发表日期2020-01-27
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要This paper provides novel evidence suggesting that securities class action lawsuits, a central pillar of the U.S. litigation and corporate governance system, can constitute an obstacle to valuable corporate innovation. We first establish that valuable innovation output makes firms particularly vulnerable to costly low-quality class action litigation. Exploiting judge turnover in federal courts, we then show that changes in class action litigation risk affect the value and number of patents filed, suggesting firms take into account that risk in their innovation decisions. A new perspective we provide is that innovation success, not only innovation failure, can increase firms' securities class action litigation risk.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Corporate governance Law and economics Innovation Patents Shareholder litigation Class action lawsuit
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14358-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543251
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Elisabeth Kempf,Oliver G. Spalt. DP14358 Attracting the Sharks: Corporate Innovation and Securities Class Action Lawsuits. 2020.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Elisabeth Kempf]的文章
[Oliver G. Spalt]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Elisabeth Kempf]的文章
[Oliver G. Spalt]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Elisabeth Kempf]的文章
[Oliver G. Spalt]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。