| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14358 |
| DP14358 Litigating Innovation: Evidence from Securities Class Action Lawsuits | |
| Elisabeth Kempf; Oliver G. Spalt | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Low-quality securities class action lawsuits disproportionally target firms with valuable innovation output and lead to substantial shareholder-value losses. We establish this fact using data on class action lawsuits between 1996 and 2011 and the value of newly granted patents as a measure of valuable innovation output. Our results challenge the widely-held view that greater failure propensity of innovative firms drives their litigation risk. Instead, our findings suggest that valuable innovation output makes a firm an attractive litigation target. Our results support the view that the class action litigation system may have adverse effects on the competitiveness of the U.S. economy. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Law and economics Innovation Patents Shareholder litigation Class action lawsuit |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14358 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543252 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Elisabeth Kempf,Oliver G. Spalt. DP14358 Litigating Innovation: Evidence from Securities Class Action Lawsuits. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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