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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP14371 |
DP14371 Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset | |
Alberto Alesina; Davide Furceri; Jonathan D. Ostry; Chris Papageorgiou; Dennis Quinn | |
发表日期 | 2020-01-31 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We assemble two unique databases. One is on reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product markets and labor markets, which covers 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other is on electoral results and timing of elections. In the 66 democracies considered in the paper, we show that liberalizing reforms engender benefits for the economy, but they materialize only gradually over time. Partly because of this delayed effect, and possibly because voters are impatient or do not anticipate future benefits, liberalizing reforms are costly to incumbents when implemented close to elections. We also find that the electoral effects depend on the state of the economy at the time of reform: reforms are penalized during contractions; liberalizing reforms undertaken in expansions are often rewarded. Voters seem to attribute current economic conditions to the reforms without gully internalizing the delay that it takes for reforms to bear fruit. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Elections Reform Regulation Finance Capital account Current account Trade Product market Labor market Employment protection |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14371 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543263 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Davide Furceri,Jonathan D. Ostry,et al. DP14371 Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset. 2020. |
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