G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14372
DP14372 Algorithmic Collusion: Supra-competitive Prices via Independent Algorithms
Karsten Hansen; Mallesh Pai
发表日期2020-01-31
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Motivated by their increasing prevalence, we study outcomes when competing sellers use machine learning algorithms to run real-time dynamic price experiments. These algorithms are often misspecified, ignoring the effect of factors outside their control, e.g. competitors' prices. We show that the long-run prices depend on the informational value (or signal to noise ratio) of price experiments: if low, the long-run prices are consistent with the static Nash equilibrium of the corresponding full information setting. However, if high, the long-run prices are supra-competitive---the full information joint-monopoly outcome is possible. We show this occurs via a novel channel: competitors' algorithms’ prices end up running correlated experiments. Therefore, sellers’ misspecified models overestimate own price sensitivity, resulting in higher prices. We discuss the implications on competition policy.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Algorithmic pricing Collusion Misspecified models Bandit algorithms
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14372
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543264
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Karsten Hansen,Mallesh Pai. DP14372 Algorithmic Collusion: Supra-competitive Prices via Independent Algorithms. 2020.
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