全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP14381 The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP14381
	DP14381 The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats
	Michael Best; Oriana Bandiera; Adnan Khan; Andrea Prat
发表日期	2020-02-04
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	Abstract We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives to a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy.
主题	Development Economics ; Public Economics
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp14381
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543275
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Michael Best,Oriana Bandiera,Adnan Khan,et al. DP14381 The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats. 2020.