| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14382 |
| DP14382 Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries | |
| Dilip Mookherjee; Pushkar Maitra; Sandip Mitra; Sujata Visaria | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-04 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We compare two different methods of appointing a local commission agent as an intermediary for a credit program. In the Trader-Agent Intermediated Lending Scheme (TRAIL), the agent was a randomly selected established private trader, while in the Gram Panchayat-Agent Intermediated-Lending Scheme (GRAIL), he was randomly chosen from nominations by the elected village council. More TRAIL loans were taken up, but repayment rates were similar, and TRAIL loans had larger average impacts on borrowers' farm incomes. The majority of this difference in impacts is due to differences in treatment effects conditional on farmer productivity, rather than differences in borrower selection patterns. The findings can be explained by a model where TRAIL agents increased their middleman profits by helping more able treated borrowers reduce their unit costs and increase output. In contrast, for political reasons GRAIL agents monitored the less able treated borrowers and reduced their default risk. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Targeting Intermediation Decentralization Community driven development Agricultural credit Networks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14382 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543276 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dilip Mookherjee,Pushkar Maitra,Sandip Mitra,et al. DP14382 Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
