| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14409 |
| DP14409 Private Credit under Political Influence: Evidence from France | |
| Anne-Laure Delatte; Adrien Matray; Noémie Pinardon-Touati | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Formally independent private banks change their supply of credit to the corporate sector for the constituencies of contested political incumbents in order to improve their reelection prospects. In return, politicians grant such banks access to the profitable market for loans to local public entities among their constituencies. We examine French credit registry data for 2007-2017 and find that credit granted to the private sector increases by 9%-14% in the year during which a powerful incumbent faces a contested election. In line with politicians returning the favor, banks that grant more credit to private firms in election years gain market share in the local public entity debt market after the election is held. Thus we establish that, if politicians can control the allocation of rents, then formal independence does not ensure the private sector’s effective independence from politically motivated distortions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Politics and banking Moral suasion Local government financing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14409 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543303 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anne-Laure Delatte,Adrien Matray,Noémie Pinardon-Touati. DP14409 Private Credit under Political Influence: Evidence from France. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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