| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14412 |
| DP14412 Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments | |
| Aner Sela; Alex Krumer; Reut Megidish | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14412 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543306 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aner Sela,Alex Krumer,Reut Megidish. DP14412 Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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