G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14457
DP14457 How noise affects effort in tournaments
Mikhail Drugov; Dmitry Ryvkin
发表日期2020-02-29
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要It is commonly understood that making a tournament ranking process more noisy leads to a reduction in effort exerted by players in the tournament. But what exactly does it mean to have ``more noise?'' We address this question and show that the level of risk, as measured by the variance or the second-order stochastic dominance order, is not the answer, in general. For rank-order tournaments with arbitrary prizes, equilibrium effort decreases as noise becomes more dispersed, in the sense of the dispersive order. For winner-take-all tournaments, we identify a weaker version of the dispersive order we call quantile stochastic dominance, as well as other orders and entropy measures linking equilibrium effort and noise.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Tournament Noise Dispersive order Quantile stochastic dominance Entropy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14457
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543356
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Mikhail Drugov,Dmitry Ryvkin. DP14457 How noise affects effort in tournaments. 2020.
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