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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP14463 |
DP14463 How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan | |
Mazhar Waseem; Joel Slemrod; Obeid Ur Rehman | |
发表日期 | 2020-03-04 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We examine two Pakistani programs to see if the public disclosure of tax information and social recognition of top taxpayers promote tax compliance. Pakistan began revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country from 2012. Simultaneously, another program began recognizing and rewarding the top 100 tax paying corporations, partnerships, self-employed individuals, and wage-earners. We find that both programs induced strong compliance responses. The public disclosure caused on average a 9 log-points increase in the tax paid by individuals exposed to the program. The increase was even larger for the social recognition program, around 17 log-points. Our results suggest that such programs can be important policy levers to mobilize resources, especially in weak-enforcement-capacity economies. |
主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
关键词 | Tax evasion |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14463 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543361 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mazhar Waseem,Joel Slemrod,Obeid Ur Rehman. DP14463 How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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