G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14463
DP14463 How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan
Mazhar Waseem; Joel Slemrod; Obeid Ur Rehman
发表日期2020-03-04
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We examine two Pakistani programs to see if the public disclosure of tax information and social recognition of top taxpayers promote tax compliance. Pakistan began revealing income tax paid by every taxpayer in the country from 2012. Simultaneously, another program began recognizing and rewarding the top 100 tax paying corporations, partnerships, self-employed individuals, and wage-earners. We find that both programs induced strong compliance responses. The public disclosure caused on average a 9 log-points increase in the tax paid by individuals exposed to the program. The increase was even larger for the social recognition program, around 17 log-points. Our results suggest that such programs can be important policy levers to mobilize resources, especially in weak-enforcement-capacity economies.
主题Development Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Tax evasion
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14463
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543361
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Mazhar Waseem,Joel Slemrod,Obeid Ur Rehman. DP14463 How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan. 2020.
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