G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14464
DP14464 Information Sharing in a Competitive Microcredit Market
Ralph De Haas; Matteo Millone
发表日期2020-03-04
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We analyze contract-level data on approved and rejected microloans to assess the impact of a new credit registry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country with a competitive microcredit market. Our findings are threefold. First, information sharing reduces defaults, especially among new borrowers, and increases the return on lending. Second, lending tightens at the extensive margin as loan officers, using the new registry, reject more applications. Third, lending also tightens at the intensive margin: microloans become smaller, shorter and more expensive. This affects both new borrowers and lending relationships established before the registry. In contrast, repeat borrowers whose lending relationship started after the registry introduction begin to benefit from larger loans at lower interest rates.
主题Development Economics ; Financial Economics
关键词Credit registry Information sharing Overborrowing Microcredit
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14464
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543362
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ralph De Haas,Matteo Millone. DP14464 Information Sharing in a Competitive Microcredit Market. 2020.
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