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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP14464 |
DP14464 Information Sharing in a Competitive Microcredit Market | |
Ralph De Haas; Matteo Millone | |
发表日期 | 2020-03-04 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We analyze contract-level data on approved and rejected microloans to assess the impact of a new credit registry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country with a competitive microcredit market. Our findings are threefold. First, information sharing reduces defaults, especially among new borrowers, and increases the return on lending. Second, lending tightens at the extensive margin as loan officers, using the new registry, reject more applications. Third, lending also tightens at the intensive margin: microloans become smaller, shorter and more expensive. This affects both new borrowers and lending relationships established before the registry. In contrast, repeat borrowers whose lending relationship started after the registry introduction begin to benefit from larger loans at lower interest rates. |
主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics |
关键词 | Credit registry Information sharing Overborrowing Microcredit |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14464 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543362 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ralph De Haas,Matteo Millone. DP14464 Information Sharing in a Competitive Microcredit Market. 2020. |
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