| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14480 |
| DP14480 Investor-State vs. State-State Dispute Settlement | |
| Henrik Horn; Thomas Tangerås | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-03-11 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | International investment agreements have been intensely criticized, and in particular the ISDS mechanisms that enable foreign investors to litigate against host countries. This paper examines the common claim that host countries benefi t from state-state dispute settlement (SSDS), since this yields less litigation. It assumes the standard rationale for ISDS, that SSDS causes political litigation costs. It shows how a host country might indeed bene fit from SSDS, but that there is no presumption that these conditions will prevail. Furthermore, negotiations regarding dispute settlement will plausibly yield ISDS, regardless of the distributional consequences for host countries, since SSDS is Pareto inefficient. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Idsd Expropriation International investment agreement Regulatory chill |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14480 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543379 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Henrik Horn,Thomas Tangerås. DP14480 Investor-State vs. State-State Dispute Settlement. 2020. |
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