| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14552 |
| DP14552 The Response to Dynamic Incentives in Insurance Contracts with a Deductible: Evidence from a Differences-in-Regression-Discontinuities Design | |
| Tobias Klein; Martin Salm; Suraj Upadhyay | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-02 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a deductible. Our approach exploits two sources of variation in a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design: deductible contracts reset at the beginning of the year, and cost-sharing limits change over the years. Using rich claims-level data from a large Dutch health insurer we find that individuals are forward-looking. Changing dynamic incentives by increasing the deductible by 100 euros leads to a reduction in healthcare spending of around 3% on the first days of the year and 6% at the annual level. We find that the response to dynamic incentives is an important part of the overall effect of cost-sharing schemes on healthcare expenditures—much more so than what the previous literature has suggested. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Patient cost-sharing Health insurance Dynamic incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14552-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543456 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tobias Klein,Martin Salm,Suraj Upadhyay. DP14552 The Response to Dynamic Incentives in Insurance Contracts with a Deductible: Evidence from a Differences-in-Regression-Discontinuities Design. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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