| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14563 |
| DP14563 Collusive Market Allocations | |
| Elisabetta Iossa; Simon Loertscher; Leslie Marx; Patrick Rey | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-05 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Collusive schemes by suppliers often take the form of allocating customers or markets among cartel members. We analyze incentives for suppliers to initiate and sustain such a collusive schemes in a repeated procurement setting. We show that, contrary to some prevailing beliefs, staggered (versus synchronized) purchasing does not make collusion more difficult to sustain or initiate. Buyer defensive measures include synchronized rather than staggered purchasing, first-price rather than second-price auctions, more aggressive or secrete reserve prices, longer contract lengths, withholding information, and avoiding observable registration procedures. Inefficiency induced by defensive measures is an often unrecognized social cost of collusive conduct. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Synchronized vs staggered purchasing Sustainability and initiation of collusion Coordinated effects |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14563 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543468 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Elisabetta Iossa,Simon Loertscher,Leslie Marx,et al. DP14563 Collusive Market Allocations. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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