G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14582
DP14582 Corrective Tax Design and Market Power
Martin O'Connell; Kate Smith
发表日期2020-04-08
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We study the design of taxes aimed at limiting externalities in markets characterized by differentiated products and imperfect competition. In such settings policy must balance distortions from externalities with those associated with the exercise of market power; the optimal tax rate depends on the nature of external harms, how the degree of market power among externality generating products compares with non-taxed alternatives, and how consumers switch across these products. We apply the framework to taxation of sugar sweetened beverages. We use detailed data on the UK market for drinks to estimate consumer demand and oligopoly pricing for the differentiated products in the market. We show the welfare maximizing tax rate leads to welfare improvements over 2.5 times as large as that associated with policy that ignores distortions associated with the exercise of market power.
主题Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词Externality Corrective tax market power Oligopoly
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14582
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543490
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Martin O'Connell,Kate Smith. DP14582 Corrective Tax Design and Market Power. 2020.
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